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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY

The Senate stated in its classified report on the FY 1986 Intelligence Authorization that, beginning with the consideration of the FY 1987 National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, the Committee would require the Director of Central Intelligence to submit an annual National Intelligence Strategy. This Strategy would contain the Director's current plans and future objectives for meeting the country's national intelligence needs. In recognition of the fact that a National Intelligence Strategy is a matter of concern to both Intelligence Committees, the Conferees agreed to endorse this requirement and set forth guidelines for the Director of Central Intelligence to use in the development of a Strategy.

In establishing the requirement for a National Intelligence Strategy, the Conferees intend to achieve the following objectives:

- (1) Make national intelligence more responsive and relevant to the needs of the intelligence consumer;
- (2) Strengthen Congressional oversight of national intelligence and the Intelligence Community;
- (3) Improve the understanding of both the Executive and Legislative branches of the objectives of the intelligence investment program and the methods used to plan and manage national intelligence; and
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(~~5~~) Better prepare U.S. national intelligence and the Intelligence Community for the future.

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The Congress, the Executive branch, and the Intelligence Community recognize that the environment in which the Intelligence Community must operate is undergoing fundamental changes. This fact is a principal justification for the development of a National Intelligence Strategy. Among the factors shaping the future intelligence environment are:

(1) The Information Explosion. All sectors of society have been affected by the greater availability and importance of information. The ability of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, and correlate this mountain of information will be critical to the success -- or failure -- of national intelligence in the coming years.

(2) The Number of Intelligence Consumers. Traditionally, the Intelligence Community has been required to supply foreign intelligence to the President, a small set of advisors, one or two Cabinet departments, and the military. Today the number of intelligence consumers is much greater, including not only the traditional consumers of intelligence, but a multitude of other Executive branch agencies and the Congress as well. The range of missions for which these consumers demand intelligence has also expanded.

(3) The Increasing Difficulty of Collection. Today's intelligence targets are tougher. Nations increasingly develop countermeasures to U.S. collection efforts. Moreover, intelligence

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sources and methods are becoming increasingly vulnerable to foreign intelligence services and unauthorized disclosure. Unfortunately, no abatement of this trend is in sight.

(4) The Complexity of Collection. The sophistication and rising costs of intelligence systems forces the Intelligence Community to extend its planning horizons. New collection systems take longer to design and develop, and the expense of these systems demand that they remain in service longer.

(5) The Competition for Resources. Though the demands facing national intelligence will increase, the Intelligence Community will be forced to fit its requirements within a tightening fiscal environment. The hard reality is that the Intelligence Community cannot assume the budget growth envisioned in their FY 1986-1990 program. Fiscal pressures facing the Nation as a whole will not allow this.

Guidelines for the Development of a National Intelligence Strategy

The Conferees agreed to endorse the guidelines set forth below for the Director of Central Intelligence to use in developing a National Intelligence Strategy. The Conferees recognize that the DCI currently conducts an extensive planning process; indeed, it is in large part the quality and the range of studies the DCI has done in the past that has convinced the Intelligence Committees of the feasibility of the National Intelligence Strategy.

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Moreover, the Conferees understand that the National Intelligence Strategy process will mature over time, and that the DCI will not be able to match the FY 1987 NFIP budget with the FY 1987 National Intelligence Strategy. Nonetheless, the challenges for national intelligence in the coming years are critical, and the Conferees direct the DCI to prepare an initial version of a National Intelligence Strategy, consistent with the guidelines below, concurrent with the transmittal of the FY 1987 budget request to Congress.

The National Intelligence Strategy will address each of the following:

(1) The requirements, generally defined, that intelligence consumers and policy makers have given the DCI. The Conferees expect these to be expressed as general, long-term "umbrella" requirements, under which specific, prioritized, shorter-term intelligence missions can be grouped.

(2) A listing of the general intelligence capabilities needed to satisfy these requirements. This listing will be seen as the "design criteria" that drive the construction of all collection and analytic programs in NFIP.

(3) A translation of these general capabilities into specific programs for collection, processing, and analysis which, in the DCI's assessment, are essential for satisfying the requirements levied on the Intelligence Community.

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(4) The DCI's actual long-term program for achieving these capabilities. This program will be broken out as follows:

- (a) A list of programs for which the DCI is requesting full authorization and funding;
- (b) A list of programs for which the DCI is requesting either partial authorization or partial funding;
- (c) A list of programs for which the Director is requesting neither current authorization or funding.

The DCI will also present his assessment of the Intelligence Community's ability to carry out its missions at present and under his proposed program for the future. The annual budget submission and review will provide the specific details of the DCI's current and long-term programs.

(5) A general support plan. This plan will assess the General Support Requirements necessary to support the DCI's program. This plan will be the aggregate of support for meeting specific missions and for general housekeeping associated with the process of intelligence.

(6) A compartmented covert action annex. This annex will explain the purpose and prospects for the DCI's covert action program. This annex will also provide the methods and criteria the DCI uses to monitor ongoing covert actions and will explain

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covert actions planned for important contingencies.

The Conferees believe that the structure outlined above provides a framework for a better understanding and appreciation of the tasks facing U.S. intelligence and the DCI's program for meeting these tasks. This framework will enable intelligence consumers and those charged with review of national intelligence plans to assess the total intelligence process and the priorities that underlie intelligence planning. It is only in this context that the Congress and the Executive branch can make wise decisions in the resources which must be committed to intelligence and, just as importantly, the specific shortfalls in intelligence that we are prepared to accept.